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We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the 
two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two 
countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on 
the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions 
of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. Then, we 
prove that there are long-term gains from trade if the marginal utility of income is constant or 
as long as losers from trade are compensated by winners. Finally, we look at a simple 
majority voting model. It turns out depending on the distribution of human capital, autarky 
and free trade with and without compensation may be the outcome of majority voting. 
JEL Code: F1. 
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 1 Introduction
In recent years the impact of trade on income inequality has been a topic
widely discussed in both academic and policy forums. What has triggered
interest in this topic is a growing concern among industrialized nations about
their ability to sustain high standards of wellbeing in the face of competition
from low wage countries. Naturally, at the theoretical level these issues
have been addressed within models where trade is motivated because of
di⁄erences in technologies and aggregate endowments.1 However, it has also
been noticed that a large volume of international trade takes place between
countries with similar technologies and aggregate endowments and work in
this area has focused in explaining their patterns of trade.2
In this paper, we argue that the implications for inequality and welfare of
this second type of trade have not been fully explored. It is well understood
that trade produces both winners and losers. It is also well understood
that if it is accompanied by an appropriate compensation scheme it will
Pareto-dominate autarky. However, it is not clear at all whether, in models
with agent heterogeneity, there exist socially acceptable mechanisms that
can implement such Pareto optimal outcomes. For example, when both the
trade regime and any redistribution schemes are decided by a majority rule.
In order to address these issues we develop a two-country, two-sector
model of trade where the only di⁄erence between the two countries is in their
distribution of human capital endowments. Their technological capabilities
and the preferences of their consumers are identical. In each country there
is a primary sector where output is produced using labor and a high-tech
sector that uses human capital as its input. We will demonstrate that even if
the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments they
will trade with the patterns of trade depending on the properties of the two
human capital distributions. In fact, in our framework di⁄erences in size
do not a⁄ect the patterns of trade. Knowledge of the two human capital
distributions is alone su¢ cient.3
1Both the theoretical and empirical literatures are extensive and have recently been
reviewed by Feenstra and Hanson (2001).
2See Brander (1991), Davis (1995), Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Krugman (1979)
for theoretical attemts to account for this observation.
3To our knowledge, Ishikawa (1996) was the ￿rst to explore the relationship between
the distribution of human capital and the patterns of trade. However, he has restricted
his attention to countries that di⁄er in aggregate endowments while we are also interested
in di⁄erences in the variance of the two distributions.
Grossman and Maggi (2000) using production technologies where workers￿talents can
be complementary in some sectors and substitutable in others have also found that the
2We will also show that together the two distributions of endowments
also completely determine the e⁄ects of trade on income inequality. More
speci￿cally, we will ￿nd that the latter always rises in the country that
exports the high-tech product and declines in the country that exports the
primary commodity. However, knowledge of endowment distributions alone
is not su¢ cient for drawing general conclusions about the impact of trade
on the world income distribution.
Next, we explore the welfare implications of our model. Not surpris-
ingly, we prove that there are long-term gains from trade as long as losers
are compensated.4 However, designing and introducing appropriate com-
pensation schemes can both be problematic. Design problems arise because
of the di¢ culty not only of separating those who gain from those who lose
but also assessing the exact size of the corresponding gains and losses. But
even in the absence of design problems compensation schemes might not be
introduced because in models with agent heterogeneity compensation might
not be the outcome preferred by the majority.5 With these observations
in mind, we compare total welfare under autarky with the corresponding
welfare under trade and ￿nd that, unless the marginal utility of income is
constant, there exist free-trade equilibria that are welfare reducing.
Then it is natural to ask what is the relationship between the initial
distribution of endowments and aggregate welfare assuming that the issues
of openness and compensation are decided by a majority vote. We provide a
complete characterization of politico-economic outcomes and ￿nd that there
exist equilibria that do not enhance welfare. This happens either because
the majority decides that the country should not trade or that it should
trade but not provide any compensation for losers from trade.
distribution of human capital can potentially matter for a country￿ s patterns of trade. This
is in contrast with our paper where as long as the distributions di⁄er the two countries
can bene￿t from trade.
In addition, both of the above paper focus on trade patterns while we are also interested
on trade￿ s consequences for inequality and welfare.
Lastly, distributions also matter in Grossman (2004) but in his model ￿rms are not
perfectly informed about workers￿productivity and their output is not veri￿able by their
employees.
4Here, we completely ignore any short-term adjustment costs as the economy moves
from one regime to another. See Davidson and Matusz (2002, 2004) for interesting work
in this area.
5See Davidson, Matusz and Nelson (2004) for an in-depth analysis of these issues within
a framework similar to ours.
32 The Model
There are two countries: A and B. Each country is populated by a contin-
uum of agents of measure 1. Each agent (i for country A and j for country
B) is endowed with one unit of labor and some level of human capital,
hi (hj), randomly drawn from the interval [1;hMAX]. Let fA and fB de-
note the density functions and FA and FB the corresponding human capital
distribution functions of countries A and B respectively.
There are two goods X and Y . Good Y is a primary commodity and
each unit produced requires one unit of labor. In contrast, good X is a
high-tech product and each unit produced requires, in addition, one unit of
human capital. The amount of good X produced by an agent corresponds
to their level of human capital. So, an agent with human capital hi produces
hi units of good X.
All agents derive utility from the consumption of both goods and they
have identical homothetic preferences.
2.1 Autarky
In this section, we derive the equilibrium under autarky. Without any loss
of generality we concentrate on country A.
2.1.1 Production Possibilities Frontier
The maximum amount of good Y that can be produced is equal to 1. Each
agent uses her single labor unit endowment to produce one unit of the pri-
mary good. The slope of the PPF at the point where it intersects the x axis
is equal to ￿(1=hMAX). This is because e¢ ciency requires specialization ac-
cording to comparative advantage, and the agent with the most comparative
advantage in producing X is agent hMAX. However, as production of the
high-tech product increases the PPF gets steeper because the new producers
have lower human capital endowments. The maximum amount of good X
that the economy can produce, ^ hA is attained when all the agents produce






At the point where the PPF crosses the y axis its slope is equal to ￿1. In








Figure 1: Production Possibilities Frontier
is equal to 1=h0 where h0 is equal to the human capital endowment of the
agent with the highest endowment among those producing good Y . Figure
1 shows the graph of the PPF.
2.1.2 Equilibrium
De￿ne as pA the relative price (i.e. the price of good Y measured in units
of good X), qA(X) the quantity produced of good X and qA(Y ) the corre-
sponding quantity of good Y . Then,
Proposition 1 Equilibrium under Autarky:
The equilibrium price satis￿es 1 < pA < hMAX and there exists a critical
level of human capital endowment, h￿
A, such that pA = h￿
A, all agents with
hi < h￿
A produce good Y , all agents with hi > h￿
A produce good X, qA(Y ) =
R h￿
A





5Proof. The proposition follows from straightforward arbitrage argu-
ments.
Notice that agents with human capital endowments equal to h￿
A are
indi⁄erent between producing X or Y .
2.1.3 Income Distribution
In order to measure incomes we need a numeraire. Any welfare comparisons
before and after a change in relative prices will be a⁄ected by the choice of
numeraire. However, as long as we are interested in changes in inequality
the choice of numeraire is inconsequential. With this in mind we use good
X as the numeraire. Then, for each type of equilibrium we can derive the
corresponding income distribution of the economy. Let zi denote the income
of agent i. Then,
Proposition 2 Income Distribution under Autarky:
Under Autarky, zi = h￿
A for all i such that hi 6 h￿
A, and zi = hi > h￿
A
for all i such that hi > h￿
A. The proportion of agents with income exactly
equal to h￿
A is given by FA(h￿
A) and the proportion of agents with income
higher than h￿
A (h￿
A < hi < hMAX) is given by 1 ￿ FA(h￿
A).
We next illustrate what autarky equilibrium looks like for a particular
utility function.
Example 1 Suppose that preferences are described by the utility function:
U(X;Y ) = U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿. For a given price pA, those agents with
hi > pA (producers of X) maximize the above utility subject to the budget









while those agents with hi 6 pA (producers of Y ) maximize the same utility








The equilibrium price h￿
A is such that the supply of Y (demand for X) is







































We next turn to consideration of opening up to international trade. In our
two country model the only way that the two countries di⁄er is in their
distributions of human capital endowments. In general, this implies that
pA 6= pB (h￿
A 6= h￿
B) which means that autarky prices di⁄er in the two coun-
tries. Di⁄erent relative autarky prices imply that there are opportunities for
trade. Thus, countries with identical amounts of human capital but di⁄erent
distributions of human capital will still have an incentive to trade.
2.2.1 Free Trade Equilibrium
As is usually the case, the autarky prices will determine the pattern of
international trade.
Proposition 3 The country with the higher relative autarky price ratio will
export good X and import good Y .
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the case where pA > pB (h￿
A >
h￿
B). Consider an agent in country A with endowment h￿
A ￿ " (" > 0 and
small). Under autarky, that agent produces one unit of Y and consumes
any linear combination of one unit of Y and h￿
A units of X. When trade
is allowed that same agent will produce h￿
A ￿ " units of X, and trade them
for (h￿
A ￿ ") 1
pB > 1 units of Y and consumes any linear combination of
(h￿
A￿") 1






X. A similar argument shows that an agent in country B with endowment
h￿
B + " who produced good X under autarky produces good Y under free





A), such that all agents in both countries with
endowments higher than h￿
G produce good X and all agents with endow-
ments less than h￿
G produce good Y . This means that more X is produced
in country A and less X is produced in country B implying that country A
will export good X.
In order to calculate the free-trade price we need to construct the global
PPF.
72.2.2 Global PPF
Using each country￿ s human capital endowments and their identical tech-
nologies we can construct a global PPF. The construction of the global
frontier follows the same rules as those followed for the construction of each
individual frontier using the global distribution of human capital endow-




The maximum quantity of Y that the two countries can produce is equal to
2 and the corresponding quantity of good X is equal to ^ hA + ^ hB.
We use the same utility function of Example 1 and compute the free
trade price.
Example 2 Suppose that preferences are described by the utility function:
U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿. The free trade price, pT, is equal to h￿












where g is the density of G.
2.2.3 The E⁄ect of Country Size
To this point, we have assumed that the two countries are of equal size.
However, in our model it is simple to derive the global trade equilibrium
when the sizes of the two countries are not equal. In this section, we change
the population of country B so that it is n times larger than country A.
The human capital distributions are assumed to be the same as above. This
implies that the measure of country B￿ s distribution is equal to n. Notice,
as there are not any economies of scale in our model, that this change has
no e⁄ect on country B￿ s autarky price. It is as if n countries with exactly
the same human capital distribution and of equal size attempt to trade.
However, there are not any gains from trade because all of them have the
same autarky price.
Our analysis in the previous section suggests that in order to ￿nd the new
global trade equilibrium price we need to derive the global human capital




8Lemma 1 As n ￿! 1, Gn(h) ￿! FB(h).
The above lemma states that as the di⁄erence in size gets larger the
global trade equilibrium price approaches the autarky price of the larger
country. In the limit, the small country cannot in￿ uence the global trade
equilibrium price.6
2.2.4 Patterns of Trade
Suppose that the two countries are of equal size and their human capital
distributions have the same mean which implies that their aggregate endow-
ments are equal. If the two human capital distributions are di⁄erent then
the autarky prices will be di⁄erent. This implies that aggregate endowments
may not be accurate predictors of the patterns of trade. This leads to two
questions.
The ￿rst is under what conditions will a country that has a higher aggre-
gate endowment in human capital export the human capital intensive good?
The second question is what properties of human capital distributions pro-
vide reliable guides to predict trade patterns? We answer the ￿rst question
with the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that preferences are Cobb-Douglas the sizes of the
two countries are equal and let FB(h) dominate FA(h) in the sense of ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance. Then country B; that is the human capital
abundant country, will export the human capital intensive good.
Proof. We need to show that h￿
A < h￿
B. First-order stochastic domi-





for every h0. Then the inequality follows directly from the autarky price
equilibrium condition (1).
This proposition identi￿es the patterns of trade for the case in which one
human capital distribution dominates the other in the sense of ￿rst-order
stochastic dominance. In this case the variances of the two distributions do
not matter. Hence, the pattern of trade depends only on aggregate endow-
ments as in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Figure 2 illustrates the
above result.
6In our model, as long as two countries have identical human capital distributions,
even if they di⁄er in size, they will not trade because their autarky prices are the same.
In contrast, in Ishikawa (1996) national economies of scale with respect to human capital







Figure 2: Comparative Advantage under First-Order Stochastic Dominance
10Given that the populations of the two countries are equal both produc-
tion possibilities frontiers intersect the y axis at the same point. However,
if the two countries produce only the high-tech good then country B, that
is the country with the higher endowment, will produce more. What the
proposition demonstrates is that when the two production possibilities fron-




qB(X). Thus, given homothetic
preferences, country B exports the high-tech good.
The above result contrasts with the no-trade result that Grossman and
Maggi (2000) derive under ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. In their model,
both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale in talent (our human capital)
and thus the slopes of the two PPFs at points where any ray through the
origin crosses them are equal. Then homotheticity implies that under au-
tarky the two countries produce exactly the same ratio of quantities of the
two goods and thus there is no comparative advantage and hence, no trade.
In contrast, in our model the returns to human capital vary across sectors
and thus, there are gains from trading.
To provide an answer to the second question we consider the case of
two distributions of human capital that have the same mean but di⁄erent
variance (mean-preserving spreads) with the additional restriction that their
cumulative distribution functions cross only once. Let the variance of coun-
try A￿ s distribution be higher than that of country B￿ s. In the terminology
of Grossman and Maggi (2000) the country A￿ s distribution is more diverse
than country B￿ s. Figure 3 shows the two production possibilities frontiers.
Notice that the two PPFs share the same intercepts. This is because (a)
the populations of the two countries are equal that implies that the maxi-
mum amount of good Y that they can produce is the same, and (b) aggregate
endowments are the same which implies that the maximum amount of good
X that they can produce is also the same. Notice that country B￿ s PPF
lies inside country A￿ s PPF. This follows from the fact that if FA(h) is more




h0 hfB(h)dh. That is, if
the two countries produce both goods and also produce the same quantity
of Y then country A will produce a higher quantity of X.
The implications for the trade pattern are clear. First note that in the
vicinity of the y intercept country A￿ s PPF is ￿ atter than B￿ s while it is
steeper in the vicinity of the x intercept. Then, continuity implies that




qB(X￿)) such that at
the points where it crosses the two PPFs their slopes are equal (MRTA =











Figure 3: Comparative Advantage under Mean-Preserving Spreads





country B exports the high-tech good.
One implication of the above discussion is that when countries only di⁄er
in the distributions of their endowments, these distributions alone are not
su¢ cient to determine the pattern of trade. We also need to know the exact
speci￿cation of preferences even when they are the same for all agents. Once
more, this result contrasts with the corresponding result in Grossman and
Maggi (2000). In their model the more diverse country always exports the
good that is produced using a process characterized by input substitutabil-
ity while the less diverse country exports the good that is produced using a
process characterized by input complementarity. Therefore, the two distrib-
utions completely determine the pattern of trade. The following proposition
summarizes our results for the case of uniformly distributed endowments.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the preferences of agents are described by the
utility function U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿ (let k ￿ ￿
￿), the sizes of the two countries
are equal, the endowments of country A are uniformly distributed on [1;2]
and those of country B are uniformly distributed on [1 + x;2 ￿ x]; where
(0 < x < 0:5). Then for each x there exists a k￿ such that for every k < k￿
country B will export the human capital intensive good while for every k > k￿
country A will export the human capital intensive good.
Proof. Notice that fA = 1, FA = h ￿ 1, fB = 1
1￿2x and FB = h￿1￿x
1￿2x .











1 + x +
p
(1 + x)2 + 4(1 + 0:5k)(2(1 ￿ x) + 0:5x2)k
2 + k
We observe that, since x < 0:5, both prices are monotonically increasing in










B > 1. These conditions are su¢ cient for
the existence of k￿ which completes the proof of the proposition.
Above we consider two countries with identical aggregate endowments
and preferences. However, country A￿ s distribution of human capital en-
dowments has a higher variance than country B￿ s corresponding distribu-
tion. The production possibilities frontiers of the two countries are depicted
graphically in ￿gure 3. At the point where the PPFs cross the horizontal
13axis the PPF of country A has a slope equal to 2 while the one of country
B￿ s has a slope equal to 2 ￿ x. In contrast, at the point where the PPFs
cross the vertical axis the PPF of country A has a slope equal to 1 while the
one of country B￿ s has a slope equal to 1 + x.
What happens to the patterns of trade depends on the relative prefer-
ences for each good and on the tails of the two distributions. As an extreme
example, consider the case where there is a very strong preference for the
human capital intensive good. Then the primary good will only be produced
in country A by those agents with very low endowments of human capital.
Similarly, if there is a very strong demand for the primary commodity then
the human capital intensive good will once more only be produced in country
A but now by those agents on the upper tail of the distribution.
Example 3 Consider an example based on the above proposition. Let x =
0:2. Then k￿ = 1:55 and for that value the autarky price in both countries
is the same and equal to 1:612. For k < 1:55 country B will export the
high-tech product while for k > 1:55 country A will export it.
The analysis of the patterns of trade so far was restricted to the case of
countries of equal size. It turns out that this restriction is inconsequential
because size variations do not a⁄ect the patterns of trade. The results of
section 2.2.3 suggests that the patterns of trade are completely determined
by di⁄erences in autarky prices which in turn are completely determined by
the distributions of human capital endowments. Put di⁄erently, two coun-
tries that are not of equal size but have the same human capital distribution
will also have the same autarky prices.
2.2.5 Trade and Inequality
We compare the income distributions of each country under autarky and af-
ter trade. In this section, we are only interested in changes in inequality and
thus the choice of numeraire does not matter. We begin with the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Trade increases inequality in the country that exports the high-
tech product and reduces inequality in the country that exports the primary
commodity.




therefore at the global equilibrium country A exports the high-tech product
while country B exports the primary commodity. Using again good X as
14the numeraire, we observe that, after trade, country A￿ s income distribution
is as follows: zi = h￿
G for all i such that hi 6 h￿
G, and zi = hi > h￿
G for all
i such that hi > h￿
G. Comparing this distribution to the corresponding one
obtained under autarky we ￿nd that all agents with hi 6 h￿
G (proportion
equal to FA(h￿
G)) have experienced a decrease in income equal to h￿
A ￿ h￿
G,
those agents with h￿
G < hi < h￿
A (proportion equal to FA(h￿
A)￿FA(h￿
G)) have
experienced a decrease in income equal to h￿
A ￿ hi, while the income of the
rest of the agents (proportion equal to 1￿FA(h￿
A)) has remained the same.
Therefore, the poor have experienced the greatest relative loss in income, the
loss of the middle-income group has been more moderate, while the incomes
of those agents in the high-income group has remained unchanged. Similarly,
comparing country B￿ s after trade income distribution to the corresponding
one obtained under autarky we ￿nd that the income of the poor (proportion
equal to FB(h￿
B)) has increased by h￿
G ￿ h￿
B, the income of those in the




G ￿ hi, while the incomes of those agents in the high-income group
(proportion equal to 1 ￿ FB(h￿
G)) has remained unchanged.7
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Proposition 6 Part1: Suppose that country B￿ s distribution dominates
country A￿ s distribution in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
Then trade will increase inequality in country B and decrease inequality in
country A.
Part 2: Suppose that countries A and B have the same aggregate en-
dowments but country A￿ s distribution is more diverse than country B￿ s.
Then trade will increase inequality in country A if there is relatively strong
demand for the primary good while inequality in country B will increase if
there is relatively strong demand for the high-tech good.
Proof. The proof of part 1 follows from Proposition 4 and Lemma 2 and
that of part 2 (for the case of uniform distributions) follows from Proposition
5 and Lemma 2.
The above results suggest that trade has the opposite e⁄ect on the income
inequality of the two trading partners. In contrast, Feenstra and Hanson
7In general, we need to be cautious with inequality comparisons because one needs to
take into account not only relative income changes but also absolute ones. For example,
an increase in the gap between rich and poor does not necessarily imply an increase in
inequality if it is also accompanied by an increase in per capita income that is uniformly
distributed. Nevertheless, such concerns are clearly irrelevant for our model. When in-
equality increases, depending on the numeraire used either the rich get richer and the poor
stay the same or the poor get poorer and the rich stay the same.
15(1996) and Zhu and Tre￿ er (2005) ￿nd that inequality increases in both
countries. The di⁄erence is that they focus on trade between developed and
developing nations where trade is driven by di⁄erences in technology whereas
we are interested in trade between countries with similar technologies, but
di⁄erent distributions of human capital.
Trade and human capital unemployment Here, as in the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model, we also ￿nd that in the country that imports the
human capital intensive good the return to human capital falls and the
reverse happens in the country that exports it. However, in our model, in
addition to this price e⁄ect, we have a quantity e⁄ect that works in the same
direction. In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model there is full employment
of all inputs in both countries both before and after trade. In contrast, in our
model, human capital is only partially employed. In fact, its employment
increases in the country that exports the human capital intensive good while
it declines in the other country. Having said that, there are no welfare losses
associated with the underemployment of human capital as its employment
is chosen optimally.8
2.3 The World Income Distribution
Before we examine the welfare properties of our economy we compare the
pre-trade world income distribution with the corresponding post-trade one.
Under the assumption that the populations of the two countries are equal
the world income distribution under autarky is given by:









2 PA < hi < hMAX
The post trade world income distribution is given by:





2 P￿ < hi < hMAX
8This need not be the case if we extend the model to allow for endogenous human
capital accumulation. If agents, at the time they make their investment decisions, are
uncertain about the trade regime then either over-accumulation or under-accumulation of
human capital can result.
16Comparing the two tables we observe that trade reduces the gap between
the rich and the poor and that there is income convergence within sectors.
However, without any information about the two human capital distribu-
tions we cannot make any general statements about world inequality. In
fact, propositions 5 and 6 together suggest that whether the gap between
two countries￿inequality measures increases or decreases after they trade de-
pends on the patterns of trade which in turn, depend on the two endowment
distributions and preferences.
3 Welfare
In this section we are going to demonstrate that uncompensated trade does
not necessarily enhance social welfare. We know that not all agents gain
from trade. But here we are going to prove a stronger result; namely that if
the losers are not compensated then trade might reduce social welfare. We





Let pa denote the equilibrium relative price under autarky. If trade is welfare






That is, if trade is welfare improving then the social welfare must be min-
imized when agents trade at autarky prices. We can prove the following
result:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the preferences of agents are described by the
utility function U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿. Then, unless ￿ + ￿ = 1, there exists a
set of prices such that if the country trades at those prices its welfare will
decrease.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the intuition for this result consider the postulated ￿ weighted
utilitarian￿social welfare function. One can think of this welfare function as
representing the expected utility of an agent whose endowment is randomly
drawn from a distribution that is the same as the distribution of aggregate
endowments. Suppose we change ￿ and ￿ but we keep the ratio
￿
￿ constant.
17We know that such a change will only a⁄ect the marginal utility of income
leaving equilibrium prices and quantities unaltered. However, expected util-
ity valuations are a⁄ected by changes in the marginal utility of income.
We next identify the relationship between the marginal utility of income
and the social welfare minimizing prices to better understand the circum-
stances under which uncompensated trade can reduce social welfare. The
next proposition completely characterizes the prices for which social welfare
falls.9
Proposition 8 Suppose that the preferences of agents are described by the
utility function U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿ and that endowments are uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [1;2]. If ￿+￿ < 1 then there exists an interval (p;pa)
such that if the country trades at a price in that interval its social welfare
will be lower relative to autarky. Similarly, if ￿ +￿ > 1 then there exists an
interval (pa;p) such that if the country trades at a price in that interval its
social welfare will be lower relative to autarky.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Putting Propositions 7 and 8 together the intuition is straightforward.
When ￿ < 1 the marginal utility of income is decreasing in income. We
know that when the equilibrium free trade price is below the autarky price
inequality increases. What happens in this case is that trade transfers in-
come from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. But, given that agents
marginal utility of income is decreasing in income, the absolute value of the
welfare losses of the poor are higher than the welfare gains of the rich. In
contrast, when ￿ > 1 the marginal utility of income is increasing in income.
When the equilibrium free trade price is above the autarky price inequality
decreases. In this case, trade transfers income from the relatively rich to
the relatively poor. But given that agent￿ s marginal utility of income is
increasing the absolute value of the welfare losses of the rich are higher than
the welfare gains of the poor.
Example 4 Suppose that the preferences of agents and their endowment
distribution have the same speci￿cations as those used in the above propo-
sition. Using the equilibrium condition under autarky given by equation
(1), we ￿nd that pa = 1:53518. We will consider two cases. Case (1):
￿ = ￿ = 0:1 (decreasing marginal utility of income). The social welfare
9It will become clear that the result must hold for any atomless distribution with a
convex domain. However, our method of proof cannot be applied for general speci￿cations
of distribution functions.
18under autarky is equal to 1:05744. The price that minimizes social welfare
is equal to 1:50743, the corresponding social welfare is equal to 1:05738 and
p = 1:47985. Case (2): ￿ = ￿ = 0:9 (increasing marginal utility of income).
The social welfare under autarky is equal to 1:67189. The price that mini-
mizes social welfare is equal to 1:55999, the corresponding social welfare is
equal to 1:67118 and p = 1:58507.
3.1 Gains from Trade
We have demonstrated that moving from autarky to free trade without com-
pensating those whose welfare is reduced by such a move can be welfare
reducing. Of course, we expect that if trade is accompanied by the ap-
propriate income redistribution then it will be not only welfare enhancing
but also Pareto-improving. We show that this is true for the case of Cobb-
Douglas preferences.
Proposition 9 Suppose that preferences are described by the utility function
U(X;Y ) = AX￿Y ￿. Then trade always Pareto dominates autarky if it is
accompanied by the appropriate income redistribution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Trade and Political Economy Equilibrium
In the previous section we showed that welfare results depend critically on
whether or not there is redistribution of income to compensate those agents
who su⁄er losses under free trade. In this section, we demonstrate that such
policies might be ruled out in a political economy equilibrium. In addition,
we are going to show that it is possible that the majority might vote for trade
without redistribution even when trade reduces aggregate welfare. We adopt
a very simple political economy model and assume that majority voting
decides (a) the choice between autarky and trade, and (b) any redistribution
policies.10 Our work follows the median-voter approach to trade policy that
was ￿rst employed by Mayer (1984) in his classic work on endogenous tari⁄
formation.
We completely characterize the political economy equilibria for the case
of diminishing marginal utility of income (￿ < 1)11 and prices in the interval
10Implicitly, in the text we have assumed that when both votes are available they take
place simultaneously. However, the results remain the same in the case of as sequential
voting procedure.
11Similar results can be obtained when ￿ > 1:
19(1;2). Our ￿rst proposition characterizes equilibria when redistribution is
not on the political agenda while the second proposition characterizes the
equilibria when both options are available. Let hm denote the human capital
endowment of the median voter; i.e. FA(hm) = 0:5.
Remember that when the marginal utility of income is diminishing if
p < pT < pA uncompensated trade reduces social welfare. We need to
consider three cases. The ￿rst case is when 1 < pT < p < pA < 2. We know
that the welfare of all those agents with human capital endowments such
that h > pA is higher under trade and the welfare of all agents with human
capital endowments such that h < pT is lower under trade. Since utility
is weakly monotonic in endowments it implies that for those agents, with
human capital endowments such that pT < h < pA there exists a threshold
level of endowment h1 such that the welfare of all agents with human capital
endowments such that pT < h < h1 is lower under trade and the welfare of
all agents with human capital endowments such that h1 < h < pA is higher
under trade.
The second case is when 1 < p < pT < pA < 2. As in the previous
case, there exists a threshold level of endowment h2 such that the welfare of
all agents with human capital endowments such that pT < h < h2 is lower
under trade and the welfare of all agents with human capital endowments
such that h2 < h < pA is higher under trade.
The last case is when 1 < p < pA < pT < 2. Now, the welfare of all
those agents with human capital endowments such that h < pA is higher
under trade and the welfare of all agents with human capital endowments
such that h > pT is lower under trade. Using a similar argument as above
we can show that there exists a threshold level of income h3 such that the
welfare of all agents with human capital endowments such that pA < h <
h3 is higher under trade and the welfare of all agents with human capital
endowments such that h3 < h < pT is lower under trade.
When the political agenda does not include the option of redistribution
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Characterization of Politico-Economic Equilibria without
redistribution for ￿ < 1.
Let 1 < pT < p
If h1 > hm then Autarky
If h1 < hm then Trade (Social welfare increases)
Let p < pT < pA
If h2 > hm then Autarky
If h2 < hm then Trade (Social welfare decreases)
20Let pA < pT < 2
If h3 > hm then Trade (Social welfare increases)
If h3 < hm then Autarky
In contrast, when the option of redistribution is included in the political
agenda we get:
Proposition 11 Characterization of Politico-Economic Equilibria with re-
distribution for ￿ < 1.
Let 1 < pT < p
If h1 > hm then Trade with Redistribution
If h1 < hm then Trade without Redistribution (Social welfare increases)
Let p < pT < pA
If h2 > hm then Trade with Redistribution
If h2 < hm then Trade without Redistribution (Social welfare decreases)
Let pA < pT < 2
If h3 > hm then Trade without Redistribution (Social welfare increases)
If h3 < hm then Trade with Redistribution
The results follow directly from the fact that when the majority of voters
are better o⁄ under trade then the outcome of the ￿rst vote will be ￿ Trade￿
and when the second vote is available the outcome will be ￿ Trade without
Redistribution￿ . In contrast, when the majority of voters are better o⁄under
autarky then the outcome of the ￿rst vote will be ￿ Autarky￿and when the
second vote is available the outcome will be ￿ Trade with Redistribution￿ .
In other words, the availability of redistribution always leads to open-
ness, however, not necessarily to higher welfare.12 It is useful at this point
to compare our results with those in Mayer (1984) that were derived within
a Heckscher-Ohlin Framework. Mayer (1984) predicts that an increase in
inequality (where agents di⁄er in their endowments of physical capital) that
keeps aggregate endowments the same will raise trade barriers in capital-
abundant economies and will lower them in capital-scarce economies. The
intuition behind this result is that capital-abundant countries export the
capital intensive good. As inequality increases the mass of agents that ben-
e￿ts from trade decreases and thus trade barriers are raised. The reverse
rationale holds for capital-scarce economies.
In contrast, in our model it is the distribution of human capital that
determines the pattern of trade. A change in inequality in our model has
12Mayer (1984) resticted his analysis to the case of a constant marginal utility of income
and thus in his model uncompensated trade is always welfare increasing.
21uncertain e⁄ects on the pattern of trade and therefore its e⁄ect on voting
patterns is not straightforward. But it is still the case that if the number of
agents that bene￿t from trade decreases then trade barriers might be raised.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have assumed that the distribution of human capital is
exogenous. One obvious extension would be to allow for endogenous accu-
mulation of skills. This can be accomplished by considering an economy in
which 2-period lived agents spend their ￿rst period of their lives investing in
skill accumulation while during the second period produce, trade and con-
sume. In such a model, the agents￿investment in skills will depend on their
expectations about both government policies and the trade regime. Because
of the associated costs with skill accumulation, underemployment of human
capital becomes a much more serious issue.
There are two types of government policies that would be worthwhile to
consider; namely redistribution policies and educational subsidies. There is
a growing literature that examines issues related to the relationship between
skill accumulation and income inequality but the majority of the work in
this area has ignored government policies. Two exceptions are Deardo⁄
(1997) and Janeba (2000). However both papers focus on the optimality
of government policies ignoring their potential implementation in systems
where decisions are not taken by a social planner but rely on a majority
rule.
Another possible extension is to consider the problem that governments
face when they decide how to allocate a ￿xed budget for investments in
human capital accumulation. In this case, government policies determine
the distribution of human capital which in turn determines the patterns of
trade and post-trade income distribution.
A third extension would be to apply our model to immigration issues.
As it stands our model cannot explain immigration because we obtain factor
price equalization.13 However, by adding a third factor, say physical capital,
that is complimentary to human capital factor price equalization might fail.
Our analysis suggests that immigration or emigration of agents will a⁄ect
both welfare and income distribution.
13In Ishikawa (1996) immigration is possible because national economies of scale with
respect to human capital imply that an individual￿ s e¢ ciency units change with migration
and factor price equalization obtains only in terms of e¢ ciency units.
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6.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Using the demand functions that we derived in example 1, we ￿nd that we
can write the indirect utility function V of an agent with income h who












. Notice that the income of an agent who pro-
duces the primary commodity is equal to p.

















Notice that the s.o.c. is also satis￿ed. Rearranging the above expression we








The proof is completed by adding the observation that unless ￿ +￿ = 1 the
solution of the above equation will not be equal to pa.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Let ￿ = ￿ +￿ and k = ￿
￿. From proposition (7) we know that the price that





In order to prove the proposition we need to show that this price increases
with ￿, i.e. the marginal utility of income. The reason that this step is
23su¢ cient follows from (a) proposition 7, where we have shown that when
￿ = 1 the minimum is attained at the autarky price, and (b) the continuity
of the social welfare function with respect to p. After solving the integral











The left-hand side of (A1), denoted by L, is strictly increasing in p while
the right-hand side, denoted by R, is independent of p. Then to complete
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= (1 + ￿)2￿+1(log2 ￿ logp) ￿ (2￿+1 ￿ p￿+1)
But this last expression is monotonically decreasing in p for 1 < p < 2 and
it is equal to 0 for p = 2 which completes the proof.
246.3 Proof of Proposition 9
Let pA and hA denote the equilibrium price and income under autarky and
pT and hT the equilibrium price and income under trade. Then we can write














Since preferences are homothetic a change in income at any given price level
will not a⁄ect the shares of income spent on each good. Suppose that after
trade we adjust each agent￿ s income so that their post-adjustment indirect
utility is equal to their indirect utility under autarky. Let ￿(hT) denote
the tax (subsidy if negative) imposed on an agent whose post-trade income












Rearranging the above expression we ￿nd that the tax (subsidy) must satisfy







In order to prove the proposition we need to show that
Z hMAX
1
￿(hT)f(h)dh > 0 (4)
That is, aggregate tax revenues must be higher than aggregate subsidy ex-
penditures which implies that the tax revenues raised from those agents
whose welfare improves under trade is higher than the total amount of sub-
sidies o⁄ered to those agents whose welfare deteriorates. Substituting (6) in





















































Notice that this expression is the same for pT > pA and pT < pA. The proof
will be complete if we can show that the above function is minimized when
pT = pA: After di⁄erentiating the above function with respect to pT, setting
pT equal to pA in the derivative and solving the ￿nal expression for pA we
￿nd that the solution for pA is given by equation (1) which gives the solution
for the autarky price. Then the above function achieves a global optimum
when pT is equal to the autarky price. It is easy to verify that the S.O.C.
also holds.
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